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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CLEO N. SMITH,
Plaintiff,

vs.
ESTHER MORRIS,
Defendant.

THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,

Case No.
8947

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
GEORGE B. HANDY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is in substantial agreement with the appellant's Statement of Facts, but would clarify and emphasize certain aspects of the case. George B. Handy was
counsel for plaintiff, Cleo N. Smith, in the case of Cleo N.
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Smith v. Esther Morris, No. 114357, in the District Cour
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. A pre-trial hearin:
of the case was held March 20, 1958 and pursuant to th
pre-trial order of the Court, dated March 24, 1958, counse
was informed that the case had been set for jury trial OJ
April 29, 1958 at 10 o'clock a. m. (R. 5). A jury of sixteeJ
qualified jurors was drawn on April 25, 1958 (R. 6).
On the 29th day of April, 1958, and at the time set fo:
trial, Attorney George B. Handy (1) did not appear; (2:
did not communicate to the Court his intention to absen
himself; (3) has never given the Court an explanation o
his absence (R. 6).
The Court, on its own motion, ordered Attorney Hand;
as a result of his conduct to pay within 10 days the sun
of $128.00, an amount equal to the costs incurred in pro
curing a jury. Although Attorney Handy was informed. o:
the Court's order on April 29, 1958, he chose to ignore it
On July 22, 1958, the Court entered a judgment in the sun
of $128.00 against defendant Handy and in favor of th1
District Court of Salt Lake County (R. 6). From this judg
ment appellant has appealed.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING
ATTORNEY HANDY TO PAY $128.00 FOR
HIS MISCONDUCT.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING
ATTORNEY HANDY TO PAY $128.00 FOR
HIS MISCONDUCT.
Contrary to the contention of appellant, we are of the
conviction that the issue in this case is not whether an
attorney is liable for the costs of impanelling a jury, but
whether an attorney may be summarily punished for his
failure to attend court.
An attorney may be guilty of contempt for wilfully
neglecting his duty to attend the trial of a case when it is
called. 12 Am. Jur., Contempt, Sec. 11, page 396. According to Section 78-32-1, U. C. A. 1953:
"The following acts or omissions in respect to
a court or proceedings therein are contempts of the
authority of the court:

"* * *
"(3) Misbehavior in office, or other wilful
neglect or violation of duty by an attorney, counsel,
clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected
to perform a judicial or ministerial service.
"* * *
"(9) Any other unlawful interference with
the process or proceedings of a court.
"* * *"
Generally the question is not whether an attorney's
failure to attend court is contempt, but whether such conduct is a direct or indirect contempt. See Annotation, At-
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torneys' :failure to attend court or tardiness as contempt,
59 A. L. R. 1272.
Section 78-32-3, U. C. A. 1953, provides:

"When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at
chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which
an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby
guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as
prescribed in section 78-32-10 hereof. When the
contempt is not committed in the immediate view
and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an
affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge
of the facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or
other judicial officers." (Emphasis added.)
Section 78-32-10, U. C. A. 1953, provides:
"Upon the answer and evidence taken the court
or judge must determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty of the contempt charged, and
if it is adjudged that he is guilty of the contempt,
a fine may be imposed upon him not exceeding $200,
or he may be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding thirty days, or he may be both fined and
imprisoned; provided, however, that a justice of the
peace may punish for contempt by a fine not to
exceed $100 or by imprisonment for one day, or by
both such fine and imprisonment."
In applying the foregoing statutes to the case at hand, two
questions are raised: (1) May an attorney be summarily
punished for failure to attend court? (2) Was the lower
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court's action in this case in the nature of a contempt proceeding?
According to the case of Lyons v. Superior Court,
(Calif.), 278 P. 2d 681, an attorney by absenting himself
from the court, and thus obstructing a trial, is within the
view and presence and knowledge of the court as would be
any other conduct by him during the trial. The California
court states as follows :
"* * *
"We are likewise satisfied that petitioner's conduct constituted 'a contempt * * * committed
in the immediate view and presence of the court'i. e., a direct contempt-which the court is empowered to punish summarily under the provisions of
section 1211 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is
clear that the trial and the attorneys' participation
in it are in the court's immediate view and presence
and, obviously, petitioner's obstruction of the trial
by absenting himself from the court is just as directly within the view and presence and knowledge
of the court as would be any other conduct by him
during, and directly affecting, the trial. If in truth,
the absence with its ensuing interruption of the
court proceedings is occasioned by some cause not
reasonably within the attorney's control, the duty
of explanation is but part and parcel of his duty to
be present, and the burden of producing the exculpatory facts to the court properly falls upon the attorney. The latter, not the judge, is the officer of
the court who under those circumstances owes a
duty of proceeding. The effect of a contrary holding
would be to absolve the defaulting attorney from
any burden of explanation of his absence, no matter
how flagrant and often repeated, unless the judge
takes the burden of filing a charge and instituting
formal proceedings. This would make of the judge
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not a judicial officer carrying out the responsibili
ties of his office, but a complaining witness in aJ
adversary proceeding. Such a rule, we think, woul1
not only be contrary to long established law bu
would not best serve the administration of justice.:
See also Shotkin v. A. T. & S. F., (Colo.), 235 P. 2d 990.
Respondent admits the existence of authority to th1
contrary wherein it has been held that an attorney's failur1
to attend court is an indirect contempt, requiring the filin!
of an affidavit and subsequent hearing. To this effect, w1
invite the Court's attention to the annotation, Attorney'1
failure to attend court or tardiness as contempt, 59 A
L. R. 1272, and to the cases of Klein v. United States, 15J
F. 2d 286, and Lee v. Bauer, (Fla.), 72 So. 2d 792. Wher
an attorney fails to attend court and therefore is not physi·
cally present in the court, the foregoing cases consider an3
resulting contempt could not be "committed in the presencE
of the court." However, it is the attorney's "absence" tha1
is offensive to the court and interrupts the trial procedure.
and that "absence" does occur in the view and presence oj
the court.
We submit that the reasoning in the Lyons decision
supra, is persuasive and recognizes that the failure of ar
attorney to attend court may be contempt and the burder
of explaining the absence should properly rest with thE
attorney himself, and not upon the court in instituting ar
adversary proceeding. The cases which would hold ar
attorney guilty of an indirect contempt through his failurE
to attend court place great weight upon the possibility tha1
such failure may arise out of excusable circumstances. WE
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would readily admit that in many cases of failure to attend
court, an attorney would have a reasonable excuse for his
conduct. However, this would not necessarily compel the
conclusion that the attorney should not be summarily punished, and require the filing of the necessary affidavit and
citation of the offender into court on an order to show cause.
We submit that under Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, one summarily adjudged guilty of contempt
for failure to appear might, upon his own motion, set forth
a reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment and, to that extent, mitigate the effect of a contempt
order. This would place the burden where it should be, that
is, on the absenting party, and at the same time permit relief
upon a sufficient showing.
The action of the lower court in entering a judgment
and order for Attorney Handy to pay $128.00 was in spirit
a contempt proceeding and was based upon the attorney's
misconduct, i. e., failure to appear and failure to inform
the court of his intended non-appearance. The action of the
court was in substantial compliance with the requirements
of Section 78-32-3, supra, and Attorney Handy could have
gathered no other conclusion from the court's action than
that the order to pay $128.00 was based upon his conduct
in failing to attend court.
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CONCLUSION
In view of the argument and authority advanced, the
judgment and order of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
RAYMOND W. GEE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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